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The Eternal Debate on External Law 
in Labor Arbitration: 
Where We Stand Five Decades After 




This article details the oft-debated issue of how labor arbitrators should 
reconcile collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with public sources of 
law, i.e., “external law,” particularly when the plain meaning of a CBA 
would lead to an arbitration award in contravention of public law.  This 
article traces the origin of the debate back to 1967, when renowned labor 
arbitrators Robert Howlett and Bernard Meltzer took opposing views on the 
matter in front of the National Academy of Arbitrators.  Although Meltzer’s 
traditional view, that arbitrators should respect the CBA and ignore the law 
when the two diverge, may have been the more dominant and reasoned one 
in 1967, recent developments in the field of labor and employment law—
namely a tremendous proliferation of employment law statutes, a shift in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and an increasingly skilled pool of 
arbitrators—have rendered Meltzer’s stance untenable.  This article lays out 
four guideposts for labor arbitrators who are confronted with this 
challenging issue, ultimately articulating an approach that allows for 
measured consideration of external law to an extent that was wholly 
unorthodox in 1967. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The proper place of external law in labor arbitration has been 
extensively analyzed since the epic debate between Robert Howlett and 
Bernard Meltzer, which brought the issue to prominence in 1967.1  The basic 
question can be stated as follows: In this system of quasi-adjudication, 
private in nature and governed by a collective bargaining agreement, what 
effect should laws promulgated outside of the private union-employer 
 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
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relationship, i.e., “public laws,” have on the parties to arbitration?  Although 
the question can be simply framed, clear answers have proven elusive in a 
labor industry that has undergone significant changes since labor arbitration 
was given an official stamp of approval by Congress in 1947,2 the Supreme 
Court in Lincoln Mills3 and the Steelworkers Trilogy4, and even since the 
Howlett-Meltzer debate in 1967.5 
Considering the significant evolution that has taken place over the last 
several decades in the labor industry, I submit that a commensurate 
evolution needs to take place with respect to the inclusion of external law in 
labor arbitration.  I believe that in this day and age, the notion of a distinct 
“law of the shop” that is wholly independent from public law is becoming 
increasingly untenable.  While not arguing for drastic changes, I do believe 
that public law has a significant role to play in this private mode of dispute 
resolution, and I believe that an increased infusion of the law would inure to 
the benefit of both parties while also allowing labor arbitration to play the 
role in labor-management relations that it was originally intended to play. 
II.  THE ROLE OF LABOR ARBITRATORS AND LABOR ARBITRATION 
To understand the role that external law should play in labor arbitration, 
one must first understand the role that labor arbitration and labor arbitrators 
assume in the world of industrial relations.  The Supreme Court has 
described the labor arbitrator’s role in the following way: 
A proper conception of the arbitrator’s function is basic.  He is not a 
public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority, 
which the parties are obliged to accept.  He has no general charter to 
administer justice for a community, which transcends the parties.  
He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and 
confined to the parties.6 
Labor arbitration is said to be a private process that is governed by the 
mutually agreed upon terms of the union and employer’s collective 
 
 2. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Harley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 
203(d), 61 Stat. 136, 153-54 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1996)) (“Final adjustment 
by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of 
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining 
agreement.”). 
 3. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).  
 4. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581 (quoting Harry Shulman, Reason, 
Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (1955)). 
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bargaining agreement.7  It is the collective bargaining agreement, then, that 
is said to empower labor arbitrators to issue orders; this distinguishes labor 
arbitrators from state and federal judges, who are empowered by publicly 
created law to issue judgments.8 
Labor arbitration also goes hand-in-hand with collective bargaining.  
Arbitration clauses are contained in 99% of collective bargaining 
agreements,9 typically providing for arbitration as the final step in the union-
employer grievance process.10  The interrelationship between arbitration and 
collective bargaining has led the Supreme Court to state: “[A]rbitration of 
labor disputes is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.”11 
In the words of renowned labor arbitrator Theodore St. Antoine, “the 
arbitrator is the parties’ surrogate, their designated spokesperson in reading 
and applying the contract,”12 who must “be faithful to the parties’ manifest 
intent in the deepest, truest sense.”13  The arbitrator must preserve the 
parties’ bargain, and he is tasked with doing so in a variety of factual 
scenarios that were either not anticipated or not specifically mentioned at the 
time of collective bargaining.14 
 
 7. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of 
Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 861, 873 n.70 
(2010). 
 10. Id. at 873.  
 11. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578. 
 12. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Presidential Address: Contract Reading Revisited, in 
ARBITRATION 2000: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 6 
(Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig eds., 2001) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Contract Reading Revisited]. 
 13. Id. at 18.  But see Richard Mittenthal & Richard I. Bloch, Arbitral Implications: Hearing 
the Sounds of Silence, in ARBITRATION 1989: THE ARBITRATORS DISCRETION DURING AND AFTER 
THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 65 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., BNA 1990) [hereinafter Mittenthal & Bloch, Sounds of 
Silence].  In discussing how they would modify St. Antoine’s description, Mittenthal and Bloch 
explained: 
[St. Antoine’s] description is accurate where . . . there are contract terms to be 
interpreted.  However, where the contract is silent on the matter in dispute, arbitrators are 
more than “contract readers.”  They then become “bargain readers” who must construe 
this silence from the standpoint of the purposes of the contract and collective bargaining 
reality. 
Id. at 81-82. 
 14. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581 (“Arbitration is the means of solving 
the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise and to 
provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of 
the parties.”). 
3
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The courts, as well as respected arbitrators and scholars, correctly note 
that labor arbitration is a private method of dispute resolution that is to be 
distinguished from judicial and administrative adjudication.  When one 
considers the strong relationship that labor arbitration has to the public at 
large, however, questions arise regarding just how “private” labor arbitration 
is or should be. 
III.  LABOR ARBITRATION’S CONNECTION TO PUBLIC LAW AND POLICY 
Although universally considered to be a private process, one must 
recognize that there are many elements of public law and policy that have 
helped give rise to and maintain labor arbitration as a popular and legal 
mode of dispute resolution. 
For one thing, labor arbitration serves an important public function in 
helping to maintain industrial peace, a public utility that initially earned it 
the endorsement of Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the 
National Labor Relations Act,15 and the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills16 
and the Steelworkers Trilogy.17  Additionally, although labor arbitrators are 
given the power to issue final orders, their orders are only enforceable by 
courts of law18—courts that also have the power (albeit a narrow one) to 
review arbitral decisions for violations of public policy.19  Finally, labor 
arbitration in many cases serves as an alternative to public adjudicative 
forums—and oftentimes this alternative is legally imposed upon a party—
barring access to the preferred public forum.20 
Labor arbitration serves as a mechanism that is significantly intertwined 
with public law and policy, a fact that counsels strongly in favor of allowing 
public law to play a significant role in its operation.21  As Theodore St. 
 
 15. 61 Stat. 136, 153-54 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1996)). 
 16. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 17. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960). 
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. 
 19. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 43 (1987). 
 20. See 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009), for the Supreme Court’s articulation 
of the statutory waiver doctrine.  See also Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132 
(Dec. 15, 2014), for the National Labor Relations Board’s most recently modified deferral policy. 
 21. Even Bernard Meltzer, who argued for a particularly limited role of external law in 
arbitration, admitted the strong connection between labor arbitration and the public interest, stating: 
(1) arbitration is an adjunct of a bargaining system shaped by the compulsion of law; (2) both the 
courts and national and state legislatures have endorsed arbitration; (3) arbitration constitutes an 
alternative and an obstacle to the use of official machinery; and (4) arbitration is designed primarily 
as an instrument of justice for the industrial community, rendering states heavily reliant upon it.  
Bernard Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
4
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Antoine once said in his presidential address to the National Academy of 
Arbitrators: “I can understand and sympathize with all those who lament the 
passing of a time when unions, employers, and arbitrators inhabited a self-
made world of labor relations, for the most part untouched by public law and 
regulation. That day is gone.”22 
IV.  WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY 
The traditional view is that external law —to some degree at least— 
may be looked to in order to help interpret the parties’ bargain,23 but where 
the law and the contract diverge, the contract must always prevail, no matter 
the consequences.24  Some labor arbitrators take even more restrictive views 
towards external law than this, claiming that the law should not even be 
referred to by arbitrators, especially by the many arbitrators without law 
degrees.  Contrarily, some take a far more accepting view towards external 
law, even allowing it to take precedence over unambiguous contract 
language. 
As many scholars of labor arbitration know, the issue became a popular 
talking point in 1967, when Robert Howlett and Bernard Meltzer took 
opposing sides on the matter at the twentieth annual meeting of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators.25 According to Howlett, “every agreement 
incorporates all applicable law,” and resultantly, “arbitrators should render 
decisions on the issues before them based on both contract language and 
law.”26  Meltzer, on the other hand, held that the arbitrator should respect the 
 
TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 5-7 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 
BNA 1967) [hereinafter Meltzer, Ruminations]. 
 22. St. Antoine, Contract Reading Revisited, supra note 12, at 18. 
 23. See, e.g., Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21, at 15 (“[W]here a contractual provision is 
susceptible to two interpretations, one compatible with, and the other repugnant to, an applicable 
statute, the statute is a relevant factor for interpretation.”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, External Law in 
Arbitration: Hard-Boiled, Soft-Boiled, and Sunny-Side Up, in ARBITRATION 2004: NEW ISSUES AND 
INNOVATIONS IN WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 185, 188 (Charles J. Coleman ed., BNA 
2004) [hereinafter St. Antoine, External Law] (“Everyone seems to agree . . . that an arbitrator may 
look to the law for guidance in interpreting a contractual provision.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720-21 (1999). 
 25. See Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21; see also Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the 
NLRB, and the Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 67 (Dallas L. Jones ed., BNA 1967) [hereinafter Howlett, Arbitrator]. 
 26. Id. at 85.  Howlett noted one caveat to his approach: where both parties tell the arbitrator 
not to consider the legal issue, he must comply or withdraw.  Id. at 87. 
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agreement and ignore the law when the two diverge.27  Meltzer’s view on 
this issue has been regarded as the “orthodox” or “traditional” position,28 and 
it is arguably still the most popular view amongst labor arbitrators.29  
Howlett has his share of supporters as well, however, and those in his corner 
may be gaining in number.30 
Although Howlett and Meltzer’s positions on the matter are the most 
well known, many other prominent labor arbitrators have chimed into the 
debate, adding additional theories to the fray.  Prominent labor arbitrator 
David Feller took an exceedingly restrictive view towards external law, 
seemingly condemning its use even for interpretive purposes.  He once 
wrote: 
My view is that an arbitrator under a collective bargaining 
agreement is normally limited to questions of interpretation and 
application of the collective bargaining agreement.  External law is 
irrelevant even where the collective bargaining agreement has terms 
that look very much like a statute.  For example, external law is 
irrelevant where an arbitrator is authorized only to interpret a 
contract, even if the contract contains language such as: “there shall 
be no discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, etc.,” 
identical to the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII.31 
For Feller, then, external law would be irrelevant even where the parties 
have purposefully tracked specific statutory language—a position that is 
extremely anti-external law even compared to Meltzer’s position. 
Richard Mittenthal’s self-proclaimed “middle ground” position is 
perhaps the most well known of the alternative theories.32  According to 
 
 27. Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21, at 16.  
 28. Ware, supra note 24, at 720-21. 
 29. See, e.g., James Oldham, Arbitration and Relentless Legalization in the Workplace, in 
ARBITRATION 1990: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON OLD ISSUES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-THIRD 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 23, 37-38 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 
BNA 1990); St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 186.  
 30. See Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Law in Labor 
Arbitration: Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. L. 1, 3, 26 (2008) (“[I]t 
is time for courts to declare Howlett the winner. . . . Regardless of whether or not Howlett was 
correct in 1964, he surely is correct today that the law is impliedly incorporated into every collective 
bargaining agreement.”); see also William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration 
Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 624 (2006) (“[A]rbitration could and should 
be reformed so as to incorporate the employment discrimination prohibitions contained in statutes as 
part of the common law of labor contract . . .”). 
 31. David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 975 
(1993). 
 32. Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND 
FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., BNA 1968) [hereinafter Mittenthal, Role 
of Law].  Mittenthal described the positions of Howlett and Meltzer as “somewhat extreme,” and 
6
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Mittenthal, an “award may permit conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned 
by contract, [but] it should not require conduct forbidden by law even 
though sanctioned by contract.”33  Importantly, Mittenthal argues that 
refusing to require violations of law would actually be in accordance with 
contractual construction.34  Therefore, Mittenthal makes clear that he is not, 
in theory, elevating the law above the contract. 
Although Mittenthal garners much credit for this “middle ground” 
position, renowned labor arbitrator Archibald Cox pressed a similar theory 
on external law long before Mittenthal’s views were publicly espoused.35  
Cox shared his views before the National Academy of Arbitrators in 1952, 
fifteen years before the Howlett-Meltzer debate: 
The parties to collective bargaining cannot avoid negotiating and 
carrying out their agreements within the existing legal framework.  
It is either futile or grossly unjust to make an award directing an 
employer to take action which the law forbids—futile because if the 
employer challenges the award the union cannot enforce it; unjust 
because if the employer complies he subjects himself to punishment 
by civil authority . . . . 
. . . . 
[A]n arbitrator should not make an award which requires violation 
of a statutory command or defined public policy.  Nor should he 
make an award based upon a contract which the courts would call 
void because against public policy.36 
An example might help illustrate the different arbitral approaches to 
handling external law.  Evans Products Co.,37 arbitrated by David Feller, 
presented an interesting fact pattern in which the relevant collective 
bargaining agreement forbade discrimination “on the basis of age.”38  After a 
seventeen-year-old applied for a position requiring him to clean a 
 
occupied a middle ground between those two approaches.  Id.  It is safe to assume, then, that 
Mittenthal would regard Feller’s theory as something akin to “really extreme.” 
 33. Id. at 50.  
 34. Id. at 49. 
 35. Archibald Cox, The Place of Law in Labor Arbitration, in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR 
ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 76 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., BNA 1952) [hereinafter Cox, Place of Law]. 
 36. Id. at 77-78. 
 37. 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 526 (1978) (Feller, Arb.).  After the arbitration proceeding, the 
employer successfully filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award with the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco, which the union appealed to no avail.  See Evans Products Co. v. 
Millmen’s Union No. 550, 159 Cal. App. 3d 815 (1984).  
 38. Evans Products Co. v. Millmen’s Union No. 550, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 818. 
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mechanical saw, the company refused employment, citing child labor 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that prohibited minors 
from cleaning woodworking machines.39  Feller, noting that the FLSA was 
not clearly incorporated into the parties’ agreement, found for the child and 
required the employer to hire him in spite of the FLSA.40  Feller opined that 
this was a clear case of age discrimination under the collective bargaining 
agreement, and assured the parties that his award would be subject to 
nullification in the courts.41 
How would other arbitrators have decided this case?  Howlett, believing 
that all collective bargaining agreements incorporate all applicable law, 
would find for the employer.42  Mittenthal, similarly, would find for the 
employer since the alternative would be to require illegal action, i.e., a 
violation of the FLSA.43  Meltzer would have been more willing to reconcile 
the contract with the law, for example, by finding that the applicant, under 
these circumstances, was not covered by the anti-age discrimination 
provision in the contract;44 but if he could not reconcile the two, then 
Meltzer would also find that the contract trumps the law, thereby finding for 
the grievant. 
Arbitrators, as the foregoing shows, vary considerably in their handling 
of external law.  The traditional view, championed by Meltzer, was quickly 
endorsed in the Supreme Court’s 1974 opinion in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,45 and seemingly continues to be the proclaimed view of many 
labor arbitrations.46  However, times have changed significantly since the 
Howlett-Meltzer debate, leading one to question if and how analysis of the 
issue should change. 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 818-19. 
 41. Id. at 820. 
 42. Howlett’s methodology resulted in the nullification of one of his awards for being based 
on the National Labor Relations Act rather than the collective bargaining agreement.  Roadmaster 
Corp. v. Prod. & Maint. Employees’ Local 504, 655 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 851 F.2d 
886 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Malin supra note 30, at 10 (“Roadmaster represents the height of 
judicial hostility to arbitral interpretation of external public law.”). 
 43. For a notable arbitral opinion representative of the Mittenthal approach, see International 
Paper Co., 69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 857 (1977) (Taylor, Arb.).  In International Paper, arbitrator 
Jay Taylor denied the union’s grievance, declaring that although the company’s actions in promoting 
a black employee over a more senior white employee violated the collective bargaining agreement’s 
seniority provision, the action was necessary in order to avoid serious repercussions under an 
Executive Order that required federal contractors to adopt an affirmative action plan.  Id. 
 44. Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21, at 15 (“[W]here a contractual provision is 
susceptible to two interpretations, one compatible with, and the other repugnant to, an applicable 
statute, the statute is a relevant factor for interpretation.”). 
 45. 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.16 (1974). 
 46. See infra Part V. 
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V.  A CHANGING DISCUSSION 
Much has changed in the labor world since 1967.  Many employment 
statutes have been promulgated, the Supreme Court has changed its tenor 
with respect to labor arbitration, and labor arbitrators have grown more 
familiar with and willing to take on legal issues. 
Of significant relevance to this discussion, many of the laws that now 
permeate the work force had either just been promulgated, or had yet to be 
promulgated, at the time of the 1967 debate: 
At the time of the initial Meltzer/Howlett debate, many of the 
current laws that may affect the subjects covered by collective 
bargaining agreements had yet to be enacted.  While Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act and the ADEA had recently taken effect, OSHA, 
ERISA, FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the 
Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and 
most recently, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA), not to mention a multitude of state laws, have since 
magnified the intersections of law and contract.47 
As a result of this booming legalization of the workplace, labor 
arbitrators, originally tasked with enforcing a distinct “common law of the 
shop,” have faced a variety of grievances that implicate legal issues in very 
significant and conspicuous ways.  Most typically, external law and the 
collective bargaining agreement can be reconciled.48  In some instances, 
however, the two simply cannot be reconciled—at least not without some 
arbitral creativity or equity49—forcing the arbitrator to decide whether or not 
to issue an award that is contrary to the mandates of public law. 
Over the last forty years, the Supreme Court has also grown far more 
accepting of labor arbitrators taking on legal issues.  In the 1974 case of 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,50 the Court took a hostile view towards 
the settlement of legal issues in labor arbitration by suggesting that labor 
 
 47. Ann C. Hodges, Fallout From 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Fractured Arbitration Systems in 
the Unionized Workplace, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 26-27 (2010).  Other relatively recent federal 
statutes of potential relevance include The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA) and 
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act).  Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-
2009 (1988)); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 
890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988)). 
 48. See St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 188 (“Truly irreconcilable conflicts 
between contract and law must be relatively rare.”). 
 49. See infra Part VI.B. 
 50. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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arbitrators were insufficiently versed in the study of law.51  The Court added 
that the machinery of arbitration, which emphasizes informality and 
quickness, rendered the arbitral forum inadequate for dealing with legal 
matters.52 
The Court’s skepticism towards the capacity of arbitrators evanesced 
over the next several decades, however, leading the Court to finally 
recognize that several of the premises it relied upon in Gardner-Denver were 
no longer tenable.  “That skepticism,” held the Court in 14 Penn Plaza v. 
Pyett, “rested on a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since 
abandoned.”53  The Court noted that “arbitral tribunals are readily capable of 
handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, . . . . [and a]n 
arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex legal questions of fact and law 
extends with equal force to discrimination claims . . . .”54  Thus, to the extent 
that arbitral incompetency is a premise supporting the “traditional” approach 
to dealing with external law,55 this premise is no longer endorsed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Since 1967, it seems that labor arbitrators’ willingness to consider 
external law has also increased.  At the time of the Howlett-Meltzer debate, 
most labor arbitrators were averse to considering external law, feeling 
incompetent to handle the nascent statutory issues and believing that the 
arbitral forum was inappropriate for legal questions.56  Interestingly, while it 
seems that the majority of labor arbitrators today claim to adhere to a 
Meltzer-like ideology,57 studies have shown that most, in practice, share the 
 
 51. Id. at 57 (“[O]ther facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to 
judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights.  Among these is the fact that the specialized 
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.”). 
 52. Id. at 56-58. 
 53. 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. 247, 249 (2009). 
 54. Id. at 268-269. 
 55. See, e.g., Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21, at 16 (“There is . . . no reason to credit 
arbitrators with any competence . . . with respect to the law.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An 
Empirical Study, in ARBITRATION 1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (Barbara D. Dennis ed., BNA 1976).  A survey of the 
National Academy of Arbitrators in 1975 revealed that two-thirds “believed that an arbitrator has no 
business interpreting or applying a public statute in a contractual grievance dispute,” and only 
fourteen percent had a familiarity with basic Title VII terminology such as “bona fide occupational 
qualification.”  Id. 79-80.  See also Gould, supra note 30, at 624 (“Subsequent to [the 1967 debate, . 
. . m]any, if not most, members of the National Academy of Arbitrators complained that the question 
of employment discrimination law was beyond their competence and that they did not view the 
process as appropriately established to address discrimination.”). 
 57. It should be noted, however, that the bulk of the research on arbitrators’ ideologies with 
respect to external law was gathered prior to 14 Penn Plaza in 2009.  See generally Edwards, supra 
note 56.  One might well argue, then, that the “traditional” ideology is no longer adhered to by a 
majority of labor arbitrators. 
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beliefs of Mittenthal, if not Howlett.58  In 2004, Theodore St. Antoine polled 
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators on this very issue,59 and 
the results he obtained were fascinating.  While most of the arbitrators said 
that they would enforce the contract over the law where the two diverged, 
sixty percent, rather anomalously, said they would not order a party to 
violate external law as part of an award,60 a la Mittenthal.61  “Today’s 
academy members,” St. Antoine said, “tend to accept the Meltzer/St. 
Antoine thesis in theory—but when the going gets tough, most of them 
move over into Dick Mittenthal’s corner, if not Bob Howlett’s.  If I must 
declare a winner in this forty year marathon, I believe it is [Mittenthal].”62 
In light of the significant changes that have taken place in the labor 
industry since 1967, this debate on external law has unquestionably taken on 
a new form.  Although it seems that events over time have added force 
behind Howlett and Mittenthal’s theories, there are still strong arguments on 
both sides of the debate, making this issue particularly challenging to 
resolve. 
VI.  REASONS FOR AND AGAINST CONSIDERING EXTERNAL LAW 
Before forming any opinion on the matter, it is instructive to review the 
arguments in favor of, and those in opposition to, considering external law in 
labor arbitration.  This section will objectively review the primary arguments 
underlying the opposing sides to the debate, focusing on the arguments’ 
strengths, as opposed to their weaknesses.  Further, this section, as well as 
the rest of the paper, will focus primarily on how an arbitrator should handle 
external law when it seemingly comes into conflict with the collective 
bargaining agreement, as opposed to situations where external law could 
simply be helpful in interpreting the contract.63 
 
 58. See Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 683, 689 (1992) (“[A]rbitrators agree with the Meltzer/Feller approach more in theory 
than in practice.”).  See also St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 186. 
 59. St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 190. 
 60. Id. 
 61. This finding is not so anomalous, however, if one believes that an arbitrator can “read 
into” a contract a provision to not require the violation of external law.  See infra Part VI.A. 
 62. St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 186. 
 63. How the arbitrator should consider external law when it does not conflict with the 
collective bargaining agreement, but rather could potentially be helpful in coming to a just decision, 
is a highly context-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to any clear answer.  Hopefully, 
however, the views expressed in the coming pages could help shed some light on this “middle 
ground” scenario. 
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A. Arguments in Favor of Considering External Law 
The arguments in favor of considering external law in labor arbitration 
are manifold.  Four general arguments, addressed below, are commonly 
proffered by those in the Howlett and Mittenthal camps. 
1. Unforeseeable Conflicts Between Contract and Law Lead to Unfair 
Results 
As discussed above, labor arbitration now exists within a labor industry 
that is governed by an incredibly large amount of governmental laws and 
regulations, the effects of which can fluctuate considerably because of 
changing governmental interpretations.64  The result is that, inevitably, labor 
arbitrators will confront situations in which the collective bargaining 
agreements before them will seem to demand results in contravention of 
external law.  To ignore the law in such a case could subject an employer to 
an order requiring him to break the law, or alternatively, permit an employer 
to continue violating his employees’ legal rights.65 
Many argue that by ignoring the law, the arbitrator risks ordering an 
unfair award that effectively punishes one of the parties for failing to foresee 
fundamental changes to labor and employment law or failing to explicitly 
incorporate each pertinent statute into the labor contract.66  Collective 
bargaining agreements are vaguely worded and relatively concise on 
purpose, as they need to be malleable enough to govern a workplace over a 
lengthy span of time.67  Justice Douglas recognized this fact in Warrior & 
Gulf, stating that the collective bargaining agreement “is more than a 
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the 
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.”68 
Forcing parties to explicitly incorporate each pertinent law into the 
contract would lead to a myriad of questions about which parts of the 
relevant statutes are being incorporated; this would create an adverse 
inference against all laws not explicitly incorporated, i.e., that those 
 
 64. Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1452 (1971).  See also Gould, supra note 30, at 636-38. 
 65. Robert G. Howlett, The Role of Law in Arbitration: A Reprise, in DEVELOPMENTS IN 
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 64, 68-71 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., BNA 1968) [hereinafter 
Howlett, Reprise]. 
 66. See, e.g., Richard Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements, in ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 30 (Spencer D. Pollard ed., BNA 1961) 
[hereinafter Mittenthal, Past Practice]. 
 67. Id. at 66-67. 
 68. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
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unincorporated laws are not to be given any consideration in the course of 
arbitration, no matter the relevance.69  It is true that there are potential 
provisions parties can include in their agreements that state, generally, that 
arbitral awards should be in compliance with law;70 but such a broadly 
worded provision risks giving too much legal authority to arbitrators, 
rendering the arbitral forum too similar to a court of law and stripping labor 
arbitration of some if its basic advantages, such as informality, affordability, 
and quickness. 
2. “Final and Binding” Language 
The vast majority of collective bargaining agreements provide that 
arbitral awards should be “final and binding.”71  For an arbitrator to issue an 
award that he knows is likely to be overturned by the courts is inefficient, 
doing a disservice to the parties and to the “final and binding” clause of their 
contract. 
By issuing an award that will likely be overturned, the arbitrator costs 
both parties time and money.72  Arbitral awards are subject to reversal if they 
violate public policy that is “well defined and dominant” as ascertained “by 
reference to the laws and legal precedents . . . .”73  Where the arbitrator 
issues an award he knows to be illegal, the result is that the parties will need 
to expend precious resources to continue litigation of the issue in the 
courts.74  Not only will this lead to added expense of time and resources, but 
it will also leave the parties in a state of limbo while waiting for a reversal 
from the courts, stunting productivity and precluding closure in the 
 
 69. Mittenthal, Past Practice, supra note 66, at 47-51. 
 70. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 29, at 32-33 (discussing “global incorporation,” which is 
“general contract language obliging the parties to behave in accordance with law”). 
 71. St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 191. 
 72. See Steven K. Birch, The Arbitrator’s Dilemma: External vs. Internal Law? Narrowing the 
Debate, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 58, 66 (1998) (“Failure of the arbitrator to decide issues of law 
promulgates economic waste and defeats one of the primary purposes behind the development of the 
arbitral process-to foster the efficient and speedy resolution of labor disputes.”). 
 73. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1987). 
 74. It is no secret that many labor unions are suffering tremendously from a lack of resources.  
See Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Letting 
Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 
975, 1013 (2010) (“Unions are beleaguered and can hardly maintain competent levels of processing 
grievances . . . .”); see also Josh Levs, Analysis: Why America’s Unions are Losing Power, CNN 
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/us/union-power-analysis/.  
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meantime.75  As Robert Howlett stated, “[t]his would result in a procedure 
contrary to the recognition and encouragement of the settlement of disputes 
by arbitration as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers 
trilogy . . . .”76  Not only would it be contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
preferences, but it would also be contrary to the “final and binding” 
language within the collective bargaining agreement, a result that could 
hardly be in accordance with the parties’ needs or preferences.77 
3. The “Poor Employee” Argument 
Proponents of the Howlett position argue that employees will be 
unfairly disadvantaged if external laws are not considered in arbitration.78  In 
support of this argument, they cite employees’ inability to afford litigation, 
questionable representation by unions in arbitration, and the res judicata 
effect that arbitration decisions can have in subsequent litigation.79 
Although Gardner-Denver80 made clear that employees will have a 
“second bite” at the apple in litigation to vindicate their separate statutory 
rights (to be distinguished from their contractual rights),81 the vast majority 
of employees who have viable employment law claims will not be able to 
obtain counsel for such lawsuits.  It is estimated that only five percent of 
individuals with employment claims who seek representation from private 
attorneys are successful in obtaining counsel.82  Additionally, government 
agencies charged with vindicating employee rights are inundated with 
 
 75. Ware, supra note 24, at 722–23 (“The confidence parties have in the finality of arbitration 
encourages parties to agree to arbitration in the first place; if more awards were vacated, arbitration 
would become more costly in terms of time and money.”). 
 76. Howlett, Arbitrator, supra note 24, at 85. 
 77. See Mittenthal, Role of Law, supra note 32, at 50 (“If the arbitrator ignores the law and 
orders the employer to commit an unlawful act, he invites noncompliance and judicial intervention. 
He knows that his award . . . is not going to be final and binding . . . . That could hardly be what the 
parties intended . . . .”). 
 78. See generally Mittenthal, Role of Law, supra note 32; Mittenthal, Past Practice, supra 
note 66. 
 79. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Incorporating Mandatory Arbitration Employment Clauses Into 
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Challenges and Benefits to the Employer and the Union, 38 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 1025, 1059-64 (2014). 
 80. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974). 
 81. But see Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of 
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 789, 854 (2013) (“[R]ealistically, 
given that the contract claim is arbitrated, and the statutory claim is litigated, there are not two bites 
at the same apple.”). 
 82. St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 196; see also Elizabeth Hill, AAA 
Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum At Low Cost, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 9, 10 (2003) (citing studies 
indicating that the majority of employees litigating employment discrimination claims were 
professional or managerial and that, as of 1991, plaintiff’s counsel would not take an employment 
discrimination case unless it involved an average of $60,000 in provable damages). 
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complainants each year, rendering the agencies incapable of helping many 
employees who are in search of justice.83  Therefore, for most employees, 
there is no legitimate possibility of a “second bite” at the apple, rendering 
labor arbitration their only hope for justice. 
Howlett proponents also argue that many unions, which are governed by 
“majority rule,”84 fail to adequately support minorities in both collective 
bargaining and arbitration.85  With that in mind, many Howlett supporters 
advance a policy-based argument that arbitrators should ensure that these 
minority employees are given a fair opportunity for justice;86 this may 
require arbitrators to refer themselves to existing discrimination laws that 
both the employer (to protect itself from an adverse ruling) and the union (to 
protect “the majority” within the workforce) may purposefully avoid 
referencing during the proceedings. 
Finally, Howlett proponents argue that employees will be disadvantaged 
if laws are not considered in arbitration because many courts, in effect, give 
arbitral decisions res judicata effect in subsequent litigation.87  In Gardner-
Denver, the Supreme Court noted the distinction between statutory and 
contractual rights, making it clear that employees are permitted to litigate, de 
novo, statutory claims arising out of the same facts that gave rise to 
preceding arbitration.88  Nonetheless, the Court stated, “[t]he arbitral 
decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court 
deems appropriate.”89  According to labor arbitrator Martin Malin, the 
proceeding dicta from the Court has proven troublesome for employees 
hoping to vindicate their statutory rights in court after failed arbitration 
efforts: “Subsequent lower-court decisions . . . have substantially eroded 
 
 83. See, e.g., Weatherspoon, supra note 79, at 1053 (“In addition to the EEOC, other federal 
agencies lack the resources to bring federal lawsuits on behalf of employees.”). 
 84. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (“In 
establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the 
benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength 
of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority.”). 
 85. See Deborah A. Widiss, Divergent Interests: Union Representation of Individual 
Employment Discrimination Claims, 87 IND. L.J. 421, 422-23 (2012) (“[T]here is a real danger that 
union leaders may themselves hold discriminatory bias and accordingly fail to support individual 
employees adequately in the grievance and arbitration process; although a union, like an employer, is 
prohibited from discriminating, it may be quite difficult for an employee to prove a union’s actions 
were motivated by discriminatory animus.”). 
 86. See Howlett, Arbitrator, supra note 24, at 82, 87, 92. 
 87. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-51 (1974). 
 88. Id. at 47-49. 
 89. Id. at 60.  The Court elaborated further on this point in footnote 21, listing relevant factors 
for courts to consider in assessing how much weight to give the arbitral decision. Id. at 60 n.21. 
15
Baldwin: The Eternal Debate on External Law in Labor Arbitration: Where We
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2016
 46 
Gardner-Denver’s holding that an employee who loses the grievance is 
entitled to de novo review on the statutory claim”.90  Since it seems that 
some employees will be negatively affected in court by unfavorable 
outcomes in arbitration, arbitrators should not be so willing to ignore the law 
if their justification for doing so is that the aggrieved employee can vindicate 
his rights in court. 
4. Labor Arbitrators Have the Ability to Handle Legal Issues. 
Howlett proponents, and even traditionalists,91 argue that concerns over 
arbitral competency are no longer tenable and that labor arbitrators are 
equally as competent as judges to handle legal questions.92  Indeed, studies 
tend to support this proposition.93  Arbitral incompetency to handle legal 
issues was a significant premise underlying Bernard Melzter’s external-law 
theory in 1967.94  Whether or not Meltzer was accurate in 1967, it seems his 
assessment is much less supportable today, as labor arbitrators have grown 
quite accustomed to dealing with legal questions, rendering them just as 
capable as judges to interpret labor and employment law. 
B. Arguments Opposing Consideration of External Law 
Arguments opposing the consideration of external law generally fall into 
two groups: the first group focuses on the role of the labor arbitrator, 
 
 90. Malin, supra note 30, at 3, 20 (citing cases establishing that, in some jurisdictions, arbitral 
decisions have in effect been given res judicata effect in subsequent litigation); see also Hodges, 
supra note 47, at 56 n.223 (“Early evidence regarding application of Gardner-Denver indicated that 
subsequent litigation seldom resulted in a decision that differed from the outcome of labor 
arbitration.”). 
 91. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Contract Reading Revisited, supra note 12, at 18-19 (“I am 
confident no member of this Academy lacks the capacity to handle most of the applicable statutes 
and other law and policy.  Take, for example, the concept of ‘discrimination’ under federal law.  It is 
subtle and elusive.  But it is not the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 81, at 807 (“[T]o the extent that labor arbitrators are 
required to specialize in employment law and understand the workplace, it is conceivable that they 
are better qualified than generalist judges to decide employment-discrimination claims.”); Bonnie G. 
Bogue, Melding External Law with the Collective Bargaining Agreement, in ARBITRATION 1997: 
THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF ARBITRATORS 82, 98 (Joyce M. Najita ed., BNA 1998) (“Whether advocates or arbitrators are 
lawyers or laypersons may not be the issue, since a law degree does not guarantee the holder has 
knowledge or experience in every area of the law, and non-lawyers may have greater expertise in a 
particular area.”). 
 93. See Levinson, supra note 81, at 844 (“[T]he cases indicate that in most instances, 
arbitrators have the ability to apply the law to the facts, not only to interpret CBA’s.”); Cole, supra 
note 9, at 865 (“Today’s arbitrators are capable of interpreting the law, are experienced with 
discrimination claims, and are as accurate as judges in interpreting the law.”). 
 94. Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 21, at 16. 
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emphasizing that he is charged with enforcing the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement above all else; the second group focuses not on the 
arbitrator, but on labor arbitration as a system, emphasizing that labor 
arbitration is not suited for robust consideration of the law. 
1. The Role of the Labor Arbitrator 
Self proclaimed traditionalists emphasize that the labor arbitrator is 
selected to perform a private function in interpreting the parties’ collective 
bargaining agreement.  As a result, the agreement has an existence that 
should be considered independently of public influences, including public 
law. 
Although this argument has strong theoretical underpinnings, it is also 
strongly reinforced by Justice Douglas’ oft-quoted dicta in United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960): 
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the 
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own 
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from 
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement . . .95 
Douglas continued, declaring that if the arbitrator’s opinion at issue 
could “be read as based solely upon the arbitrator’s view of the requirements 
of enacted legislation . . . [then] he exceeded the scope of the submission.”96 
Simply put, the arbitrator, it is said, serves a role that is entirely private 
in nature.  He owes nothing to the public at large, nor does he possess the 
ability to pass upon legal issues within the province of trained jurists. 
2. The Role of Labor Arbitration 
The second argument opposing the consideration of external law is that 
labor arbitration is not, as a system, adequately equipped to handle such 
issues, and further, that modifying labor arbitration to make it more equipped 
would move labor arbitration away from the system’s greatest advantages. 
First, those in the Melzter camp argue that some of arbitration’s greatest 
attributes—speed, informality and cost-effectiveness—would be threatened 
 
 95. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
 96. Id. at 597. 
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if external law started serving a bigger role in arbitral decision making.97  
Typically, there are no rigid rules of evidence or procedure in labor 
arbitration.98  Along those same lines, lawyers are often not needed in labor 
arbitration, and indeed, they commonly are not present in the proceedings.99  
Entangling labor arbitration with issues of law would have the effect of 
complicating the proceedings,100 causing delays in progress, and making the 
overall process more expensive for both parties.  Unions, subject to a 
statutory duty of fair representation,101 could be forced to hire additional 
legal support to remain competitive in the proceedings, a policy 
consideration worthy of special notice considering the increasingly scarce 
resources of many unions.102 
Second, Meltzer supporters note that aggrieved employees and 
employers can always turn to courts or government agencies to vindicate 
their statutory rights.103  Thus, the argument goes, there is no need for 
arbitrators to worry themselves with legal issues when they are not called 
upon to do so, as the arbitration of contractual rights will not preclude 
litigation on those same facts.104 
Third, arbitral awards carry no force of law by themselves because 
courts are charged with enforcing arbitral awards.105  Thus, if an arbitral 
 
 97. See, e.g., Birch, supra note 72, at 61 (“The feared consequence of creeping legalism is that 
it will undermine the cost-effectiveness of the arbitration process as compared to traditional 
litigation, thus defeating the primary reason for its existence.”). 
 98. Levinson, supra note 81, at 800-01. 
 99. See, e.g., Arthur Eliot Berkeley, Arbitrators and Advocates: The Consumers’ Report, in 
ARBITRATION 1988: EMERGING ISSUES FOR THE 1990S, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST 
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 290, 297 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 
BNA 1989). 
 100. For example, burdens of proof under certain statutory schemes are quite different from 
those applied in traditional arbitral settings.  See Richard I. Bloch, The Changing Face of Just 
Cause: One Standard or Many?, in ARBITRATION 2000: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 20, 26 n.18 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
Bloch, Changing Face]. 
 101. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).   
 102. See Hyde, supra note 74, at 1013. 
 103. Some even argue that courts are more hospitable to employees than arbitral forums, 
although this position appears to be held by a distinct minority.  See Mark D. Gough, The High Costs 
of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in 
Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 106 (2014) (“[E]mployee win 
rates and award amounts are substantially lower in arbitration compared to those found in 
litigation.”). 
 104. A related argument is that the development of laws intended to benefit the public should 
not be left to private dispute resolution, which is typically confidential, since this would deprive the 
public of information about the dispute and its resolution.  Levinson, supra note 81, at 802. 
 105. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 
(1957).  
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award is truly contrary to law, aggrieved parties will always be able to 
appeal the award to the judiciary to right the perceived wrong. 
A fourth point attacks the ability of the labor arbitrator to handle legal 
issues.  Although many modern-day scholars posit that labor arbitrators do 
have the competence to handle legal issues,106 there is still a contingent that 
believes arbitrators simply lack the same ability as judges to understand and 
apply the law.107  More commonly, scholars have faith in arbitrators’ ability 
to apply the law, but note that the law is so often in flux or so unclear that 
arbitrators should be advised to leave those issues to the courts.108  This 
point is particularly compelling with respect to NLRB law, as the Board has 
been known to vacillate on major issues with each change in 
administration.109  Considering the narrow judicial review standards for 
labor arbitration, many legal errors by arbitrators could be etched into stone 
as between the parties, another point cautioning against the consideration of 
external law.110  David Feller notes a related point: 
Once arbitrators go beyond the collective bargaining agreement, 
they lose the justifications for their immunity from review. 
Arbitrators have special expertise.  They are chosen by employers 
and unions because of their familiarity with industrial relations and 
their ability to solve these problems. When arbitrators start 
interpreting statutes, however, there is no reason why their 
interpretations of the proper application of statutes should be given 
greater weight than that of the district courts.111 
In other words, labor arbitrators were originally given so much 
insulation from judicial review because of their perceived expertise in the 
“common law of the shop.”  Once arbitrators start deciding issues of public 
law, however, these lax standards of judicial review lose their justification. 
 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
 107. See Levinson, supra note 81, at 803. 
 108. See, e.g., Bernard Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinders, in DEVELOPMENTS 
IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL 
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 58, 63 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., BNA 1968) 
(“The genuine difficulties surrounding the role of law arise in situations where the law implicated in 
a grievance is complex, uncertain, and in flux.”); St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 187 
(“In many instances the law is simply not that clear or settled.”). 
 109. See Bok, supra note 64, at 1452 (“One cannot deny, of course, that interpretations of the 
National Labor Relations Act tend to vacillate somewhat from one administration to another.”). 
 110. See Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhoff, The Evolving Role of the Labor Arbitrator, 21 
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 199, 238 (2005) (“The generally lenient standards of judicial review may 
place even greater pressure on arbitrators to get the law right, as no higher authority is likely to 
correct their mistakes.”). 
 111. Feller, supra note 31, at 980.  
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VII.  GUIDEPOSTS FOR LABOR ARBITRATORS 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that there are strong arguments on 
both sides of this debate.  It is also clear, however, that the labor industry has 
undergone significant change in the last several decades, fundamentally 
altering the factors involved when one considers how a labor arbitrator 
should reconcile the collective bargaining agreement with external law.112  
Although the issue is highly complex and context-specific, I will now 
advocate for four basic principles to serve as guideposts for labor arbitrators 
confronted with this question. 
A. A Strict “Four Corners” Approach to Contract Interpretation Has no 
Place in Labor Arbitration 
Right off the bat, it is important to note that a strict “four corners” 
approach to contract interpretation would be highly imprudent in the 
collective bargaining context.  Once one accepts this proposition as true, 
then it should be much easier to accept the idea that external law can play a 
significant role in labor arbitration, regardless of whether or not it was 
explicitly incorporated into the agreement. 
The Supreme Court made clear in Warrior & Gulf that in interpreting 
collective bargaining agreements, arbitrators are to look beyond the terms of 
the contract: “The labor arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to the 
express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law—the 
practices of the industry and the shop—is equally part of the collective 
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it.”113  Douglas quoted 
esteemed labor arbitrator Archibald Cox to further elucidate this point: 
There are too many people, too many problems, too many 
unforeseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract the 
exclusive source of rights and duties.  One cannot reduce all the 
rules governing a community like an industrial plant to fifteen or 
even fifty pages.  Within the sphere of collective bargaining, the 
institutional characteristics and the governmental nature of the 
collective-bargaining process demand a common law of the shop 
which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement.  We 
must assume that intelligent negotiators acknowledged so plain a 
need unless they stated a contrary rule in plain words.114 
 
 112. See infra Part VII.A.-D. 
 113. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960). 
 114. See id. at 579-80 (citing Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. 
REV. 1482, 1498-99 (1959)).  
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Arbitrators, respecting the instruction of Douglas and Cox, have 
commonly looked beyond the plain meaning of collective bargaining 
agreements in a number of ways.  First, many arbitrators are willing to let 
past practices between the parties override unambiguous contractual 
language, at least insofar as the past practices are long standing and well-
accepted as between the parties.115  Second, it is common practice for 
arbitrators to read “just cause” provisions into collective bargaining 
agreements where such language is not provided for.116  This practice is 
commonly carried out even in spite of the Supreme Court’s admonishment 
that arbitrators do “not sit to dispense [their] own brand of industrial 
justice.”117  Third, in considering the “common law of the shop,” arbitrators 
will look to decisions from other arbitrators who interpreted other contracts 
governing two other parties.118  Finally, most arbitrators subscribe to the 
“reserved rights” theory of interpretation, i.e., they assume that employers 
are entitled to all those rights that they have not contracted away, even if the 
contract says nothing to that effect.119  To the many arbitrators that subscribe 
to this reserved rights theory, then, the existence of a “management rights” 
clause in the contract is simply redundant and given little or no independent 
effect.120 
The purpose of this sub-section is not to question the prudence of any of 
the above practices—indeed, all are eminently reasonable.  This sub-section 
simply notes that there is no standard practice of looking solely at collective 
bargaining agreements in labor arbitration.  The contract must be 
supplemented in order to give effect to the parties’ true intentions and to 
allow the parties to quickly and fairly reach a resolution on their respective 
issues.  Once one accepts that the foregoing practices are commonly 
employed in labor arbitration, and often without objection, one must feel 
 
 115. See, e.g., Mittenthal, Past Practice, supra note 66, at 30; St. Antoine, Contract Reading 
Revisited, supra note 12, at 14 (“[A] long-standing and well-accepted practice may prevail even over 
a ‘clear’ and ‘express’ provision in the agreement.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Bloch, Changing Face, supra note 100, at 22 (“Even when contracts are silent on 
the standard, most arbitrators will readily infer [a just cause standard] to the extent that management 
will be hard-pressed to argue successfully for any other approach. . . .”).  
 117. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
 118. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a 
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 501 (1976) (“Although arbitrators often cite no other decisions in their 
opinion and never consider other cases as binding precedents, they usually are quite aware of the 
pattern of decisions by other arbitrators and are reluctant to deviate far from that pattern.”). 
 119. Mittenthal & Bloch, Sounds of Silence, supra note 13, at 69-70. 
 120. Id. at 70 (“Indeed, the management rights clause becomes irrelevant, once the arbitrator 
accepts the ‘reserved rights’ theory.”). 
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more accepting of allowing external law to also play a significant role in the 
process, even when it is not explicitly referred to in the parties’ agreement. 
B. The Presumption of Legality Needs to be Very Strong 
Most labor arbitrators believe that when there are two possible 
interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement—one that would lead to 
an illegal award and one that would lead to a legal award—the arbitrator 
may assume that the latter interpretation is proper.121  Even though most 
arbitrators agree with this proposition, arbitrators vary in how willing or able 
they are to find a “legal” interpretation of the agreement when it arguably 
conflicts with external law.  I submit that labor arbitrators need to go above 
and beyond, if necessary, to find a way to interpret the agreement so as to 
issue an award that is in compliance with law.  On this point, I find myself in 
agreement with Richard Mittenthal in stating that labor arbitrators may 
“permit” illegal conduct, if necessary, but they should not demand it. 
When an arbitrator demands illegal action, he is forcing a party to face 
adverse legal action in the courts.  In other words, he is forcing the party to 
be a two-time loser, with losses in both arbitration and a subsequent judicial 
or administrative proceeding.122  One might astutely point out that the two-
time loser can “simply” go to court to have the arbitral award reversed; but 
judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely narrow, resulting in reversal 
only where there is a violation of “explicit” and “dominant” public policy, or 
where the award resulted from “dishonesty” or “fraud.”123  Moreover, 
litigating the issue(s) would require significant time and money, leading 
additionally to a stressful work environment and a lack of closure for the 
parties.  Labor arbitrators should be striving for finality in their awards—
especially where there are, as is typically the case, “final and binding” 
clauses in the agreement124—and should therefore not issue awards that will 
inevitably and senselessly lead to additional litigation.  Such a result could 
hardly be what the Supreme Court and Congress had in mind when they 
gave their initial endorsements to labor arbitration over five decades ago.125 
 
 121. See, e.g., Antoine, supra note 18.  
 122. Common sense dictates that this two-time loser would almost always be the employer. 
 123. United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 43 (1987) (“[A]s long as 
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his 
decision.”); see also Ware, supra note 24, at 722 (“The absence of a record and reasoned opinions, 
combined with the very limited grounds on which courts may vacate arbitration awards, results in 
extremely few awards being vacated.”). 
 124. St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 191. 
 125. See Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 889 (2d Cir. 1982) (“It makes 
little sense to require the arbitrator to . . . render a decision that may be in conflict with the mandate 
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Interpreting contracts with a strong presumption of legality is quite 
supportable from a contract-interpretation standpoint, as well.  As stated 
above, labor arbitrators rarely apply a strict “four-corners” approach to 
contract interpretation, and oftentimes they will read unstated terms into the 
agreements and ignore unambiguous language that would otherwise dictate 
contrary results.  Reading into agreements a provision to the effect that 
neither party should be forced to violate the law would not be much different 
from reading in a “just cause” provision.126  It is inconceivable that either 
party would ever agree to a contract that would demand that they break the 
law,127 and the fact that an explicit provision to that effect is missing should 
only be taken as a limit, not a complete prohibition, on arbitral consideration 
of external law.  Moreover, to the extent that other parties within the 
respective industries have a practice of not demanding violation of law, the 
argument could be made that this has become “the common law of the 
shop,” which the Supreme Court has admonished is part of every collective 
bargaining agreement.128 
To be sure, the argument I am advancing would require some equitable 
considerations on the part of arbitrators; but considering the overarching 
arbitral goals of fairness and justice (as constrained by the contract, of 
course), a dose of arbitral creativity and equity is not unreasonable, nor is it 
a consideration foreign to adjudicative forums.129  Importantly, going greater 
lengths than normal to find a contract interpretation that is consistent with 
law is not the same thing as allowing the law to subvert the contract.  Rather, 
it is a realist approach to contract interpretation that reads into the contract 
an intent not to demand illegal activity.130  Such action on the part of 
arbitrators does both parties a favor by preserving their contract, saves the 
 
of law and that therefore might later be set aside.  This resolution would thwart federal policy rather 
than further it.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 2-4. 
 126. See Bloch, Changing Face, supra note 100, at 22. 
 127. Martin, supra note 25, at 27 (“[C]ourts should enforce awards based on external public law 
because the parties assume compliance with public law when negotiating the contract.”). 
 128. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960) 
(“[T]he practices of the industry and the shop . . . is equally part of the collective bargaining 
agreement although not expressed in it.”). 
 129. See Howlett, Reprise, supra note 65, at 65 (“[C]ourts . . . take the rules . . . as a general 
guide, determine what the equities of the cause demand, and contrive to . . . render a judgment 
accordingly, wrenching the law no more than is necessary.”); see generally Cornelius J. Peck, 
Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 130. See Mittenthal & Bloch, Sounds of Silence, supra note 13, at 66 n.5 ([A]rbitrators are in a 
real sense always ‘adding’ to the contract . . . . As long as that ‘addition’ draws its essence from 
some express contract provision or from the underlying purposes of the contract, it remains a 
legitimate form of contract interpretation.”). 
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parties time, expense and hassle, and does not punish the parties for a lack of 
foresight and specificity in contract drafting within an ever-changing legal 
landscape. 
C. To Broach or Not to Broach? 
An important question remains: how should the arbitrator broach the 
external-law issue? Should the arbitrator raise the issue sua sponte, or should 
he wait for a party to raise the external-law question?  Howlett,131 Cox,132 
and Mittenthal133 argue that the arbitrator should, sua sponte, probe for 
conflicts between the law and the contract.134  My belief is that the arbitrator, 
as a neutral adjudicator, should almost always wait for one of the parties to 
raise the external law issue, even if the arbitrator notices a potential conflict 
between law and contract.135 
Although there is perhaps more flexibility for arbitrators to be proactive 
than there is for judges, arbitrators are not advocates.  Nor are arbitrators 
mediators.  The arbitration process includes party advocates for a reason, 
and in order to allow these advocates to fulfill their obligations as they see 
fit, arbitrators should remain relatively passive throughout the proceeding 
and allow the parties—who indeed created the collective bargaining 
agreement in the first place—to make their own cases.136  Unilaterally 
infusing arguments into the proceeding would serve to subvert the 
advocates, benefit one party over another, and, incidentally, tarnish the 
arbitrator’s reputation in an industry in which reputation is paramount.137 
Additionally, arbitrators are rarely given advanced notice of the issues 
that are to come before them.  As labor arbitrator Bonnie Bogue notes, “It is 
 
 131. Howlett, Arbitrator, supra note 24, at 92. 
 132. Cox, Place of Law, supra note 35, at 79. 
 133. Mittenthal, Role of Law, supra note 32, at 50. 
 134. St. Antoine conducted an interesting study on this very topic within the National Academy 
of Arbitrators.  See St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23.  He found “considerable divergence of 
opinion about whether arbitrators would ask the parties for their positions on the use of external law 
when there appears to be a conflict between law and contract.”  Id. at 190. 
 135. I say “almost always” in recognition of the fact that these sorts of issues arise in a number 
of complicated and varied contexts.  Thus, the door should perhaps remain open to raising the legal 
issue sua sponte in appropriate circumstances where adverse consequences would otherwise appear 
substantial and certain.  
 136. It is true that in some instances party representatives may prove incompetent.  Still, 
however, employers select their representatives at their own peril, and employees will have recourse 
against their union representatives if they fail to provide adequate representation.  See Vaca v. Sipes, 
386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
 137. Unilaterally raising legal issues could also run arbitrators into conflict with ethical 
guidelines.  See Malin & Vonhoff, supra note 110, at 236 (“The arbitrator raising the issues on her 
own . . . may bring herself into conflict with the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators 
of Labor-Management Disputes . . . .”). 
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the lucky arbitrator who is only confronted with the issue in the relative 
sanctity of the office, with time to deliberate over well-crafted written 
arguments and with research tools available.”138  Raising a legal question 
sua sponte is dangerous considering the lack of briefing on the subject, the 
inability for advocates to make a knowledgeable oral argument on the issue, 
and the complexities and frequent changes in legal standards. 
The argument in favor of restraint is strengthened by the NLRB’s new 
deferral policy, articulated in Babcock & Wilcox Construction Co.139  
Previously, NLRB policy was to defer to arbitral awards where, essentially, 
the arbitrator “considered” the unfair labor practice issue.  It would be 
presumed that the arbitrator considered the unfair labor practice issue when 
(i) the contractual issue was factually parallel to the unfair labor practice 
issue, (ii) the arbitrator was presented with the general facts relevant to the 
unfair labor practice claim, and (iii) the award was not “clearly repugnant” 
to the purposes and policies of the National Labor Relations Act.140  This lax 
deferral standard resulted in many employees being prevented from bringing 
unfair labor practice claims to the NLRB,141 whether the legal issue was 
actually considered in the preceding arbitration or not.  Under Babock & 
Wilcox Construction Co.,142 however, the NLRB will only defer where, inter 
alia, the party urging deferral proves that the arbitrator was explicitly 
authorized to decide the unfair labor practice issue and was presented with 
and considered the statutory issue, meaning that the arbitrator actually 
“identified” the legal issue and at least generally addressed it.143  This 
holding, coupled with Gardner-Denver,144 puts much less pressure on 
arbitrators to identify legal issues, and instead leaves the fate of legal claims 
in the parties’ hands.  If the legal issue is not raised in the arbitration, the 
doors to the NLRB and the courts should remain open for the parties.145 
However, if a party raises an arguably meritorious legal argument, the 
arbitrator should ensure that both sides are given an opportunity to speak on 
 
 138. Bogue, supra note 92, at 84. 
 139. 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, slip op. at 13 (Dec. 15, 2014). 
 140. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984). 
 141. Babcock, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, slip op. at 2. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 7-10 (“We shall find that the arbitrator has actually considered the statutory issue 
when the arbitrator has identified that issue and at least generally explained why he or she finds that 
the facts presented either do or do not support the unfair labor practice allegation.”).  Notably, this 
holding is limited to 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) cases.  Id. at 1. 
 144. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 145. Id. at 58-60. 
25
Baldwin: The Eternal Debate on External Law in Labor Arbitration: Where We
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2016
 56 
the matter, including through post-hearing briefs, if necessary.146  Not only is 
this fair to both parties, but this recognizes that many arbitrators are not legal 
experts,147 and therefore should welcome the opportunity to become more 
informed on pertinent legal issues.  In order to preserve party resources and 
avoid the over-legalization of arbitration, the arbitrator should not ask for 
legal arguments or supplementation when he knows that the law should not 
or need not be considered in deciding a particular case. 
D. Although the Law Has a Definite Role to Play in Arbitration, Its Use 
Needs to be Carefully Circumscribed 
Although the position I advance is more welcoming of external law than 
is the traditionalist position, it must be recognized that in order for labor 
arbitration to continue to serve the role it was originally intended to play, the 
use of external law needs to be carefully circumscribed. 
For starters, arbitrators need to be careful about deciding what sections 
of relevant statutes they decide to “incorporate” into the parties’ bargain.  
Even when parties expressly incorporate a statute into their collective 
bargaining agreement, the arbitrator should not assume that each section, of 
what could be a highly complex statute, was intended to be incorporated. 
Labor Arbitrator Richard Bloch sums up the issue soundly: 
[A]bsent clear guidance from the parties, the assumption by the 
arbitrator must be that these statutes have been incorporated, if at 
all, for the purpose of absorbing their generalized benevolent goals, 
and not necessarily for their specifics in every detail . . . It is 
unlikely that the parties will have focused on the myriad of ticklish 
problems that can arise, such as burdens of proof, remedies, or 
arcane legal ramblings . . . .148 
Allowing each provision of a complex statute to play a role in 
arbitration would make labor arbitration longer, more complicated and 
expensive, and would introduce elements into labor arbitration that are 
foreign to the forum.  Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, for 
example, provide for punitive damages149 and attorney’s fees.150  However, 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Although statistics vary, it is safe to say that just about half of American labor arbitrators 
are lawyers.  See Cole, supra note 9, at 876; Birch, supra note 72, at 64.  Although evidence 
suggests that arbitrators, both lawyer and non-lawyer, are capable of handling some legal issues, see 
supra text accompanying notes 91-93, this does not address the fact that the law is complicated and 
constantly in flux.  Even seasoned judges may rely on briefing, law clerks, and outside experts to 
appropriately analyze legal issues. 
 148. Bloch, Changing Face, supra note 100, at 37. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1981). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). 
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traditional labor arbitrations do not provide for punitive damages and 
attorneys’ fees absent unusual circumstances.151 
Also, in the interest of preventing the over-legalization of arbitration, 
arbitrators should only go “above and beyond” to find a legal interpretation 
of the contract when the alternative would be to require illegal conduct.  
When the arbitrator simply permits, rather than requires, illegal conduct, the 
aggrieved party is still able to vindicate his statutory rights in the appropriate 
judicial or administrative forum.  Thus, when the arbitrator simply permits 
illegal conduct that is allowed by the parties’ bargain, he is not forcing 
anyone to be a two-time loser or law breaker, and the equities of the 
situation tip in favor of following the contract. 
Although individuals might have benevolent purposes in mind when 
arguing that labor arbitrators should make greater efforts to look out for 
minority or vulnerable employees, these arguments fail to give 
countervailing weight to important considerations: (1) the “majority rule” of 
collective bargaining has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a 
necessary byproduct of collective bargaining;152 (2) although unions may 
have a history of discriminating against minorities, these practices seem to 
have all but disappeared;153 (3) unions are subject to a duty of fair 
representation;154 (4) judicial and arbitral forums exist separately for a 
reason; and (5) the arbitrator needs to decide cases impartially, without 
dispensing “his own brand of industrial justice.”155  The “poor employee” 
argument may have political appeal, but arbitration should be devoid of 
politics, and therefore this argument is ultimately not compelling. 
Finally, one needs to realize that over-reliance on the law threatens the 
attributes of labor arbitration that have made it such an integral part of labor-
management relations.  Labor arbitration quickly and efficiently resolves 
work disputes in a relatively inexpensive and informal manner.  Over-
reliance on the law would require parties to expend more money on legal 
resources, protract the resolution of sensitive work issues, and fundamentally 
change the nature of labor arbitration to make it a formalized process almost 
indistinguishable from that which occurs in a courtroom.  There is a 
significant role for the law to play in labor arbitration, but the law should not 
 
 151. Hodges, supra note 47, at 38. 
 152. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975). 
 153. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 9, at 864 (“To ensure their survival, unions have become 
staunch advocates of traditionally unrepresented groups as they recognize that members of those 
groups form a large percentage of their newest and most supportive members.”). 
 154. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
 155. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
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play a role bigger than necessary to efficiently resolve the work dispute in a 
manner that is faithful to the parties’ bargain. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the labor industry has evolved considerably over the 
last several decades.  Over time, labor arbitration has grown much more 
intertwined with public law and policy, casting doubt upon the claim that the 
forum is wholly private in nature. Because of this evolution, modifications 
need to be made to the “traditional approach” to interpreting collective 
bargaining agreements.  It is no longer reasonable to ignore the significant 
effect that external law has in the workplace, and indeed it has become 
apparent that the line between “the common law of the shop” and external 
law has been significantly blurred. 
The four guiding principles I have proffered seek to modify Meltzer’s 
traditional approach by allowing measured consideration of external law to 
the extent necessary to maintain industrial peace, prevent unfair results, and 
ultimately issue an award that accords with the various needs and intents that 
underlie the parties’ bargain.  While allowing external law to play an 
increased role in the proceedings, its use is tempered by only allowing 
certain core aspects of external laws to be incorporated, by requiring one of 
the parties to raise the external law issue, and by only allowing external law 
to trump an otherwise clear agreement when the agreement would demand 
an award that required violation of law.  These limitations are in recognition 
of the fact that labor arbitration is a forum that exists separately from judicial 
and administrative forums.  Labor arbitration was created to quickly and 
efficiently resolve disputes in the workplace, and although the evolving 
labor industry has forced the forum to make some adjustments, the law was 
never intended to play a major role in labor arbitration, and nor should it 
today, lest the forum lose the very attributes that make it such an appealing 
system of dispute resolution. 
Moving forward, one must ask what changes can be made to labor 
arbitration to render it better suited to identifying and resolving legal issues.  
One potential change would be to require all labor arbitrators to possess law 
degrees or, alternatively, to receive continued legal education.  Considering 
that just about half of American labor arbitrators are not lawyers, it seems 
doubtful that a law degree will become a mandatory requirement any time 
soon.  Requiring some form of continued legal training might be prudent, 
however, especially if the NLRB reverts back to its old Olin deferral 
standard, under which many employees’ legal rights under the NLRA were 
effectively decided in arbitration.  In any event, it would certainly be 
beneficial to the parties to come before an arbitrator who possesses at least a 
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basic understanding of the current state of law under the major labor and 
employment statutes.156 
It is probably true that most labor arbitrations do not implicate 
significant issues of external law.157  Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
unions represent more than sixteen million employees in the United 
States,158 and almost all of these employees are covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause.159  It is clear, then, 
that labor arbitration continues to play a major role in the governance of the 
American workplace, making it imperative that we continue to adapt the 
forum to help it respond effectively to changes in the labor industry.  As rare 
as the external law dilemma may be, all labor arbitrators should know how 
to resolve it when it rears its ugly head. 
 
 156. To the extent that having an arbitrator who lacks significant legal training is problematic, 
however, this problem is greatly alleviated by the fact that the parties typically have great flexibility 
in choosing an arbitrator who can suit their specific needs on an ad hoc basis.  See JAY E. GRENIG & 
ROCCO M. SCANZA, FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR ARBITRATION 27-35 (2011); Cole, supra note 9, at 
873-74. 
 157. See Perry A. Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of 
Arbitral Awards, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 31, 45 (1985) (finding that external law played a major role in 
just five percent, and a minor supporting role in just ten percent, of a sample of published arbitration 
awards); see also St. Antoine, External Law, supra note 23, at 189 (“Fortunately for me, both parties 
have always agreed on either my considering the law or my ignoring it.”). 
 158. Levinson, supra note 81, at 794. 
 159. See Cole, supra note 9. 
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